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This issue of Current Biology includes two reviews on
the biophysics of cell motility. They focus on the
mechanism of force generation by polymerizing and
depolymerizing cytoskeletal filament proteins, and
emphasise the contributions to understanding these
processes of quantitative theoretical analyses. The
work covered in these reviews is squarely in the
tradition of biophysics, where — as in physics — the
importance of theory is unquestioned and experiment
and theory generally advance hand in hand. 
In many areas of biology, the relationship between
theory and experiment has been much less cosy than
in physics: major advances in recent years at least
have been driven by technological developments and
empirical data obtained at an ever-increasing rate. My
editor at Nature in the 1980s, John (now Sir John)
Maddox, used regularly to lament the fact that biology
was, for this former theoretical physicist, too unquan-
titative and untheoretical a science. The regularity of
this complaint was such that the usual response
among the biologists in the office was a rolling of the
eyes. Yet one could easily understand how someone
with this background would find unsatisfying many
biology papers, with their essentially qualitative con-
clusions, often along the lines of some molecule x
having a ‘role’ in some process y. 
I would take issue with this attitude on two grounds:
first, quantitative theoretical analysis is actually routine
in many areas of biology, for example it is essential in
population genetics and biophysics (Rutherford would
probably have accepted these as branches of physics,
dismissing the rest as stamp collecting); and sec-
ondly, there is little advantage in attempting quantita-
tive theoretical analysis prematurely, before a field is
ready for it. According to Peter Medawar’s well-known
principle, biologists have been successful where they
have appreciated that the practice of science is the art
of the soluble. 
But biology is different from fundamental physics.
It was all very well for Einstein to take the observation
that the speed of light appears to be the same what-
ever frame of reference it is measured in, and deduce
the Lorentz transformations of length and time
between reference frames. But it is fairly rare in
biology to be able to make accurate predictions by
pure mathematical reasoning from general basic
laws, or infer precisely defined general laws from
observations (Mendel providing an exception here).
More often, biology is about working out how a
complex process works, and many details have to be
determined by experiment. Biology, on the whole, is
a science of specific solutions. Just seeing a striped
pattern, for example, does not imply a particular
mechanism: there are many different ways in principle
by which such a pattern could be generated (though
sophisticated thinking about how a problem could be
solved in principle can be very productive — such
thinking played a major part in elucidation of the
genetic code, for example, and is a mainstay of
computational neurobiology).
Things seem to be changing a little, however, partly
as a result of the explosion in data production by
genome sequencing and related projects. One
illustration of this development is the fact that Cold
Spring Harbor held a meeting on ‘systems biology’
earlier in the year. Precisely what this term means is
open to debate, but the general idea is clear: that it is
not good enough to simply churn out data and hope
for enlightenment; rather, that real understanding of
how biological systems function will require rigorous
theoretical analysis of the kind that has been more
characteristic of physics.
But it would be a mistake to think that the growing
interest in what some people refer to as ‘computa-
tional biology’ is confined to genomics. Indeed, to this
observer it would seem more likely that successes will
come where theory is applied to specific systems that
have been subject to extensive dissection by tradi-
tional experimental methods. We are seeing signs of
this happening in areas of cell and developmental
biology where, until recently, experimentalists and
theoreticians seemed to be pursuing parallel lines of
enquiry. Not surprisingly, these often concern systems
whose behaviour is particularly difficult to grasp by
intuition, such as those involving feedbacks. An
example is the paper from Julian Lewis in our August
19th issue, on the ‘segmentation clock’. In verte-
brates, segmental structures are produced sequen-
tially, and this is thought to involve cyclic expression
of genes of the Notch signalling pathway. In his paper,
Lewis reports a model involving negative feedback
loops: using parameters in the physiological range,
the model can reproduce key aspects of the system,
and shows that the delay due to the time taken to
transcribe the cycling genes is a key determinant of
the period of the oscillations.
Feedbacks are also key in another example where
experimental and theoretical studies have come
together to illuminate pattern formation: the position-
ing of the paired ‘dorsal appendages’ in the Drosophila
egg in response to EGF receptor signalling. Elegant
experimental work, primarily in Matthew Freeman’s
laboratory, led to the following qualitative model. The
pattern-forming process is thought to start with the
production by the fly oocyte of one form of EGF recep-
tor ligand, Gurken, which activates receptor molecules
on adjacent follicle cells. The cells respond by produc-
ing a protein, Rhomboid, which in turn activates a pre-
cursor form of a second EGF receptor ligand, Spitz —
a positive feedback loop. This initially results in there
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being a single maximum of receptor activation — but
those cells receiving the highest level of activation
produce a secreted inhibitor of the EGF receptor,
Argos, and this negative feedback splits the signal,
creating a ‘signalling valley’ in the inter-appendage
region. Last year, Lauffenburger and colleagues
reported in Development an elegant quantitative
version of this model and computational analysis of its
properties: they showed that qualitative model really
does work, though a stable two-peaked pattern is only
obtained when the inhibitor Argos diffuses faster than
the activator Spitz. By varying the parameter range
they were able to show that different solutions can be
obtained, with different numbers of signalling peaks,
variations which can indeed be generated by genetic
perturbations and may be indicative of potential for
evolutionary change.
Another issue that has been productively addressed
recently is that the ‘robustness’ of developmental pat-
terning networks: Garrett Odell and colleagues
reported a nice example of this in our May 14th issue
last year. They took as their example the neurogenic
network of the fruitfly Drosophila: the main element of
this is lateral inhibition by Notch signalling, in which a
cell that starts to differentiate as a neuron within a
field of initially equivalent cells signals via the recep-
tor Notch on its neighbours to inhibit them from
following the same fate. Odell and colleagues were
able to show using their model of the neurogenic
network that the system is ‘robust’ — that is, it has the
appropriate pattern-forming behaviour over a wide
range of parameter values. And as a bonus their work
suggested how an apparent contradiction in the pub-
lished experimental data on this system could be
resolved.
Computational analysis is also providing insights
into the properties of intracellular signalling pathways
and networks. This approach has long been advocated
by Dennis Bray, whose recent work has focussed on
chemotactic signalling in the bacterium Escherichia
coli. One remarkable property of this system is that
bacterial cells can detect gradients of attractant
molecules ranging over five orders of magnitude in
concentration. In 1998 in Nature, Bray and colleagues
reported analyses showing how the requisite low
threshold of response and wide dynamic range can be
achieved by a cell with a combination of single recep-
tors and clusters of receptor molecules that communi-
cate, one molecule influencing its neighbours as a
function of its own activity.
Theory has a distinguished history in biology — one
simply needs to think of Darwin and Mendel. The latter
is a particularly interesting case: one could argue that
Mendel’s brilliant inference of the fundamental rules of
genetics is the most important biological advance that
has come from careful quantitative analysis; it is no
coincidence that Mendel had a background in physics.
The central role of quantitative analysis continues in
population genetics, which inherently depends on sta-
tistical methods to capture the stochastic behaviour of
large collections of alleles in populations. Population
biology also provides an interesting — and rather rare
— example where theoretical developments in biology
have influenced other fields: the application by Robert
May (now Lord May) of the mathematics of non-linear
dynamics to the study of population biology played a
major part in triggering the explosion of interest in
chaos theory in the 1980s and had a great influence on
the physical as well as biological sciences. In fact, the
influence went even farther afield, to the arts — Tom
Stoppard acknowledged the influence of May’s work
on his wonderful play ‘Arcadia’, in which one character
is hard at work trying to develop a model to explain the
seemingly random catastrophic declines in local
grouse populations.
Theory clearly also played a key role in the classi-
cal era of molecular biology, those golden times when
the titans of the field worked out how information is
stored, replicated and interpreted in living cells. Just
recall how Francis Crick — who has been referred to
as the only truly successful theoretical biologist of
modern times — worked out the essential features of
the genetic code, with a strong prediction that it
would be based on unpunctuated triplets, pretty
much by logic alone. Crick’s prediction of the
existence of transfer RNA must be one of the most
brilliant insights ever in biology.
Returning to biophysics, physical ideas and
methods are naturally applied to studies of the
mechanical and dynamic properties of molecules and
cells, and to the electrophysiological properties of
excitable cells, particularly neurons. The latter pro-
vides another case where theoretical analysis has
made a major contribution in biology: Hodgkin and
Huxley's Nobel-prize-winning analysis of how specific
transmembrane currents and ion currents give rise to
the action potential is still valid and shows some par-
allels in its precise, and accurate, quantitative predic-
tions to the way Bohr’s quantized model of the atom
accounted for the energy levels of the hydrogen atom.
Hodgkin and Huxley’s work was certainly a kind of
systems biology: they showed how biological
components identified in typical reductionist empirical
studies can be put together to explain a complex bio-
logical phenomenon. There is a relationship in princi-
ple between approaches of this kind and those that
are attracting new interest in the post-genomic era.
Systems biology, computational biology, call it what
you will, is not a radically new development, but the
areas of biology that have been dominated in recent
years by the rapid accumulation of data, particularly
molecular data, are maturing, and there is now an
increased awareness of the importance of precise
quantification and mathematical analysis.
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